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Abstract
This paper examines the interactive effects of risk ratings and banking
relationships on debt maturity choice. Previous studies posit that there
exist important interactions between risk ratings and proprietary
information generated from monitoring. I test their predictions by
introducing banking relationships as a proxy for proprietary information
about borrowers. I find that, in the absence of prior banking
relationships, both low-and high-risk firms borrow on shorter-term
bases than intermediate-risk firms. With long-lasting banking
relationships, however, the effects of risk ratings on maturity
substantially decline. The findings here suggest that information
asymmetry is at the root of debt maturity choice.
Keywords: debt maturity, information asymmetry, risk rating, banking
relationship
INTRODUCTION
Firms with long-term investment opportunities can borrow
short-term today and refinance later, or they can simply lock in a
long-term rate instead. How do such firms choose the optimal
maturity of their debt? Numerous explanations have been
advanced in the literature. For example, the influential studies of
Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) demonstrate that a firm’s
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choice of debt maturity hinges on asymmetric information and
the borrower’s credit quality, while other theories of debt
maturity stress the role of agency costs, taxes and other market
frictions (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1981; Haugen and
Senbet 1979; Myers 1977). 
In this paper, I test the predictions of Flannery’s (1986) and
Diamond’s (1991) theoretical models. The closest work to this
paper is Berger and colleagues (2005), who test Flannery’s and
Diamond’s predictions concurrently within the framework of a
single empirical model. In particular, Berger et al. investigate
how the adoption of small business credit scoring (hereafter,
SBCS) technology affects debt maturity and interacts with risk.
Similarly to Berger et al. (2005), I test whether debt maturity is a
monotonically increasing function of credit risk rating under
information asymmetry as Flannery (1986) predicted, or a
nonlinear function of credit risk rating as Diamond (1991)
predicted. By contrast to Berger et al. (2005), however, I focus on
information asymmetry due to the lack of a banking relationship
rather than due to no use of SBCS. 
Previous studies have shown that durable relationships
between borrowers and lenders can attenuate information
asymmetries, benefiting both creditors and informationally-
problematic small firms (Petersen and Rajan 1994b; Berger and
Udell 1995; Bharath et al. 2007). While SBCS employs
quantifiable information, such as accounting information, to
generate a “numerical credit score” corresponding to the
borrowers’ credit-worthiness at relatively low expenses, the
intrinsic nature of small firms requires continuous monitoring of
their credit performance through long-lasting relationships.
Despite the important role of the banking relationship in small
business financing, to the best of my knowledge, no prior
research has assessed the impact of a durable banking
relationship and its interaction with risk rating. This study
attempts to fill the gap.
Banking relationships appear to be an important determinant
of debt maturity choice. The reduced information asymmetry
through a durable banking relationship may imply that
borrowing firms do not need to incur transaction costs to get
better terms in the future, indicating that they are more likely to
borrow on a longer-term basis. On the other hand, with a
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banking relationship established, higher-risk firms face fewer
difficulties in rolling over short-term debt. As a result,
intermediate or high-risk firms are less likely to lock in a
relatively higher long-term rate, and therefore they decide to
borrow shorter term. At the same time, there can be a supply-
side effect: the reduced information gap between lenders and
borrowers can also imply that the lenders are more willing to
provide longer-term debt to higher-risk firms that cannot initially
borrow long-term funds. Taken together, the impact of banking
relationships on the debt maturity terms of borrowers is
ambiguous and can only be resolved empirically. 
My findings can be briefly summarized as follows. Consistent
with the prediction of Diamond (1991) but against that of
Flannery (1986), I find loan maturity to be a non-monotonic
function of risk ratings in the presence of information asymmetry
proxied by lack of a banking relationship. Specifically, when
there are no durable relationships between lenders and
borrowers, I find that firms with low- and high-risk ratings
borrow in shorter terms than firms with intermediate risk
ratings. I also find that long-lasting banking relationships do not
significantly increase the maturity of low-and high-risk firms but
substantially reduce that of intermediate-risk firms, reducing the
overall effects of risk ratings on loan maturity. 
The empirical findings of this study provide two main
contributions to the existing literature. First, I provide further
evidence on the important role of banking relationships in small
business financing. Existing literature focuses on the impact of
banking relationships on pricing and availability of loans to
small businesses but tends to neglect their impact on loan
maturity (see, e.g., Boot 2000 and Goldberg and Vora 1981).
Second and more importantly, this study establishes the
interactive effects of bank monitoring and credit scoring on debt
contracting. For instance, Diamond (1991)’s theory posits the
important interactions between risk ratings and additional
information generated through monitoring, but no prior
empirical research has directly tested its predictions. This study
provides the first evidence of the validity of Diamond’s model.1)
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1) Despite the contributions of the findings, however, it is important to note that
there are certain limitations in applying the main findings to publicly traded
firms that can issue public debt, as this paper does not provide any evidence
BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991) models are similar in
that both models attempt to explain the debt maturity choice of
borrowing firms and its link with credit quality under
information asymmetry, while the models make different
predictions about debt maturity choice of risky borrowers.
Flannery (1986) considers a two-period model in which
borrowers choose their optimal maturities to minimize the
transaction costs of debt financing. Specifically, the borrowers
economize on the costs of issuing new debt and expected credit
risk premia under asymmetric information. Since the probability
of being a good (or bad) borrower is updated at the end of period
one, a bad borrower who mimics the choice of a good borrower
by choosing a short-term maturity has to pay higher risk premia
than a good borrower when it rolls over its short-term debt. In a
given condition, low-and high-risk borrowers sort themselves
out, leading to a separating equilibrium: bad borrowers (risky
borrowers) prefer long-term debt, and good borrowers (safe
borrowers) prefer short-term debt. Therefore, Flannery (1986)
predicts that, in the separating equilibrium, a firm’s choice of
debt maturity reveals its assessment of its true credit-
worthiness. In summation, riskier firms borrow longer-term by
considering the trade-off between lower transaction costs of
having a new loan and higher risk premia.2)
Diamond (1991) also considers a two-period economy. Unlike
in Flannery’s (1986) model, however, credit rating is initially
available to lenders, and some projects owned by borrowers have
negative expected net present values, implying the lenders can
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on the role that credit ratings play for publicly traded firms. The findings of
this paper can be specific to bank loans to small businesses that are unable
to issue relatively long-term public debt. I would like to thank the
anonymous referee for pointing out this careful suggestion.
2) To make sure the yield curve slopes upward, I estimate the average returns
on treasury securities with different maturities by using data from the
Federal Reserve website. For the period of 1993 to 2007, the average return
on five-year bonds is 5.032%; the average return with ten-year bonds is
5.39%; the average return on twenty-year bonds is 5.86%. For the year of
2003, 2.97%, 4.01% and 4.96% are for five-year bonds, ten-year bonds, and
twenty-year bonds, respectively, confirming the prediction. I thank the
anonymous referee for this suggestion.
reject the renewal of (short-term) debt financing when bad news
arrives at the end of period one. When firms borrow short-term,
they can refinance at a lower rate on the arrival of good news at
the end of period one, but when bad news arrives, their projects
can be liquidated. Debt maturity is determined by considering
the costs of early liquidation and a borrowing firm’s preference
for maturity based on private information about its project
quality. Low-risk firms prefer shorter-term debt to refinance at
lower costs since they are less likely to face liquidation, while
intermediate and high-risk firms prefer long-term debt to avoid
the substantial costs of early liquidation. Importantly, in
Diamond’s (1991) model, some high-risk firms can borrow only
short-term, particularly when liquidation value is high enough to
support short-term debt. In this setting, Diamond (1991) predicts
that both low-risk and high-risk firms borrow on a shorter-term
basis than intermediate-risk firms, particularly when information
asymmetry is severe. 
Prior empirical studies investigate the link between risk ratings
and the maturity structure of (total) debt. For example, Barclay
& Smith (1995) show that both publicly-traded firms with high
bond ratings and firms without bond ratings are more likely to
issue short-term debt than those with low ratings. If firms
without bond ratings are considered as the riskiest firms, the
evidence supports the claim that risk is non-monotonically
associated with maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr
and Hulburt (2001) also find a non-linear relationship between
debt structure and risk ratings for both listed and unlisted small
firms. As pointed out by Berger et al. (2005), however, these
studies do not distinguish between “a newly issued 1-year bond
and a 30-year bond with 1 year remaining.” Instead, they treat
both types of bonds as a 1-year debt in maturity structure. This
approach seriously undermines the validity of their tests. A
related strand of empirical research assesses the impact of risk
on the maturity terms of newly-issued debt, but it does not test
for nonlinearities (Mitchell 1993; Guedes and Opler 1996). 
It is important to note that, unlike Diamond’s (1991) and
Flannery’s (1986) theoretical predictions, none of these studies
directly test whether there is a link between maturity and risk
rating under different levels of information asymmetry. To the
best of my knowledge, Berger et al. (2005) is the only exception.
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Unlike this study, however, Berger et al. do not directly test the
predictions of Diamond’s (1991) model but instead focus on
testing the predictions of Flannery’s (1986) model under which
lenders cannot initially observe borrowers’ risks.
The main test of Diamond’s model is based on the following
regression model of debt maturity:
ln (1+Maturity) = β0 + β1×Relationship + β2×HighRisk + β3
LowRisk
+ β4×HighRisk×Relationship + β5×LowRisk
×Relationship (1)
+ Control variables for firm characteristics
+ Industry dummies + ε
The dependent variable is the natural log of one plus Maturity,
where Maturity is the time (in months) until the full repayment
of a loan is due. One is added since maturity is often a number
close to zero. The variable Relationship is the log of one plus the
length of the banking relationship (in months). The length of the
banking relationship measures how long a firm conducted
business with its lender before the former receives a loan.
I also include two dummy variables to allow for the non-linear
effect of risk ratings on debt maturity based on credit score data
from Dun & Bradstreet (see Small Business Finance Group
2007).3) The Dun & Bradstreet Credit Scores (hereafter, DBCS)
range from one (highest risk) to six (lowest risk). Specifically, the
dummy variable HighRisk equals one if the firm’s DBCS is either
one or two, and zero otherwise. In a similar manner, the dummy
variable LowRisk takes a value of one if the DBCS is five or six.
Firms with intermediate risk, defined as those with DBCS of
three and four, are treated as the benchmark category in the
regression, and therefore the regression model does not include
the dummy variable for firms with intermediate risk. Thus, the
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3) Dun & Bradstreet does not provide detailed information about how it
constructs credit rating. However, it has been known that the credit rating is
based on accounting information about financial stability and payment
history. Importantly, although the information on how to construct the credit
rating is minimal, the credit rating seems to provide one of the most available
pieces of information about the credit quality of small businesses. For
instance, in many cases, the information from Dun & Bradstreet is required
for U.S. federal government transactions.
coefficient for Relationship, β1, captures the effect of the
banking relationship between lenders and firms with
intermediate risk on debt maturity choice. 
Finally, following Petersen and Rajan (1994a) and Berger et al.
(2005), I also control for various firm and contract characteristics
as well as industry-specific effects. I use lack of a prior banking
relationship as a proxy variable for information asymmetry.
However, the increase in banking relationship may imply that
the firm is larger, older, and more profitable rather than that
more proprietary information was gathered by a lender, therefore
resolving the information asymmetry. To avoid this possibility, I
control for total assets, firm age, and ROA, and debt-to-asset
ratio. Moreover, since asset maturity affects debt maturity and
asset maturity is likely to be determined by industry-specific
technology, I also control for 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects.
DATA
The primary data source is the Federal Reserve’s 2003 Survey
of Small Business Finances (SSBF). The survey contains detailed
information regarding the most recent loans to small firms with
fewer than 500 employees. The sample firms were selected by
using a stratified sampling procedure to avoid under-
representation of firms located in rural areas or managed by
minority ethnic groups. All the statistics and regressions
reported in this study are weighted to control for the sampling
design (see the Technical Codebook for the Survey of Small
Business Finances 2007). 
Following Cole, Goldberg and White (2004), the data that I use
for my regression estimates include bank loans to small firms
but exclude those loans initiated before the information on firm
characteristics was available. The final data consist of 1,859
bank loans to small firms. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the borrower and the
loan characteristics. Consistent with the description of the firms
in the survey, the firm’s total assets are on average less than one
million dollars. The summary also shows that there is enough
diversity in risk ratings that I can test the potential monotonic
relationship between risk ratings on debt maturity.
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UNIVARIATE COMPARISONS
Before turning to the multivariate regression results, first I
examine how loan maturity terms vary with the length of
banking relationships by comparing the former for various credit
ratings. Panel A of figure 1 shows that high- and low-risk firms
have shorter maturities than intermediate-risk firms, but the
differences appear to be trivial and economically small.
In Panel B of figure 1, I consider whether the relationship
between risk ratings and maturity terms changes with the extent
of the banking relationship. To that end, I divided the sample
into three subsets based on the extent of the relationship: short-
term (maturity terms ≤ 1 year), medium-term (1 < maturity terms
≤ 10 years), and long-term relationships (maturity terms > 10
years). As Panel B of figure 1 shows for short-term relationships,
loan maturity is a non-monotonic function of risk ratings. In
particular for short-term banking relationships, the loan
maturity terms for low- and high-risk firms are substantially
shorter than those for intermediate-risk firms by 8.64 and 5.97
years, respectively. Both Flannery and Diamond predict that,
with information asymmetry reduced, firms with lower risk are
more likely to borrow longer-term. Surprisingly, however, the
maturity terms of low-risk firms do not increase monotonically
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Total assets (unit: dollars) 960,089 59,789
Firm age (unit: years) 14.21 0.37
Banking relationship (unit: months) 95.62 3.78
ROA 0.93 0.14
Cash to total assets 0.13 0.01
Outside debt to total assets 0.66 0.03
LowRisk (D&B score =1 & 2) 0.31 0.02
MedRisk (D&B score=3 & 4) 0.44 0.02
HighRisk (D&B score=5 & 6) 0.25 0.01
Loan maturity (unit: months) 60.23 3.29
Collateral requirement 53% 2%
Loan amount (unit: dollars) 194,490 11,222
with longer banking relationships. For medium-term
relationships, the loan maturity first decreases slightly before it
starts increasing with longer banking relationships. The finding
does not seem to square well with the extant theories.
More interestingly, when the banking relationship is short-
term, the maturities for intermediate-risk firms are significantly
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Figure 1. Lending Relationship, Credit Rating and Debt Maturity
Panel A: Debt Maturity and Credit Rating
Panel B: Three Groups Based on Lending Relationship 
(Short-, Medium-, and Long-term Relationships)
longer than those for low- and high-risk firms by about seven
years, but the maturities sharply decrease after the relationship
extends for more than one year, only starting to increase again
as the relationship extends for more than ten years. This may
imply that firms with intermediate risks choose shorter-term
loans since durable banking relationships reduce information
asymmetry and there is less difficulty in revolving loans in the
future. In contrast, consistent with the predictions by Flannery
(1986) and Diamond (1991), the maturity terms of high-risk
firms monotonically increase with longer banking relationships.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS
In this section, I formally test the findings of the previous
section by estimating multivariate regression models. 
Table 2 reports the results from the baseline weighted
regressions of equation (1). The first column of table 2 presents
the results for all types of bank loans. As specified in equation
(1), the coefficients for ‘LowRisk (D&B score 5-6)’ and ‘HighRisk
(D&B score 1-2)’ capture the effect of risk ratings on loan
maturity in the absence of a banking relationship. The results
reveal that consistent with the univariate comparisons in the
previous section, loan maturity terms are a nonlinear function of
risk ratings under information asymmetry. Specifically, t-tests
show that both low- and high-risk firms borrow on a shorter-
term basis than intermediate-risk firms, which is consistent with
the prediction of Diamond’s model but contrary to the prediction
of Flannery’s model. The coefficients of the variables LowRisk
and HighRisk are –0.979 and –0.934 respectively, and those
coefficients are statistically significant at the level of 0.01. These
results are inconsistent with the findings of Berger et al. (2005),
who found that loan maturity is a monotonically increasing
function of risk ratings. In particular, Berger et al. (2005)
assume that banks that do not employ risk rating technology
face acute information asymmetry, and therefore the loans that
such banks offer should have maturities that are monotonically
increasing in risk ratings. Unlike Berger et al. (2005), I focus on
the lack of a prior banking relationship between lenders and
borrowers, and my results show that loan maturity is a non-
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monotonic function of risk ratings, particularly without durable
banking relationships. This finding supports Diamond’s
prediction that the observed debt maturity is determined by both
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Table 2. The Interactive Effects of Risk Ratings and Banking
Relationships on Loan Maturity
Dep. Var.: ln(1+Maturity) All loans Lines of credit Other loans
ln(Total assets) -0.007 0.068* -0.039+
(-0.40) (2.31) (-1.86)
ln(Firm age) (unit: years) 0.115** 0.069 0.019
(4.07) (1.06) (0.61)
ROA -0.006 -0.014** -0.016**
(-1.51) (-2.77) (-3.22)
Cash to assets -0.048 -0.683* 0.007
(-0.44) (-2.29) (0.06)
Outside debt to assets -0.049** 0.094* -0.064**
(-3.58) (2.32) (-4.05)
ln(1+banking relationship) -0.275** -0.406** -0.253**
(-10.99) (-8.72) (-7.51)
LowRisk (D&B score 5-6) -0.979** -2.288** -0.648**
(-4.51) (-7.13) (-3.43)
HighRisk (D&B score 1-2) -0.934** -1.612** -0.456**
(-5.82) (-5.96) (-2.80)
LowRisk×ln 0.232** 0.508** 0.170**
(1+banking relationship) (3.93) (6.86) (3.12)
HighRisk×ln(1+banking 0.258** 0.343** 0.185**
relationship) (6.35) (5.13) (4.18)
Loan type fixed effects Yes No Yes
2-digit SIC Industry 
Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
Adjusted R2 0.516 0.519 0.585
Number of obs. 2,458 817 1,641
The dependent variable for regressions is log of one plus maturity.
Banking relationship refers to the period of time (in years) the first
banking service was provided to a borrowing firm. The first column is a
regression of all types of loans; the second column is a regression of
lines of credit; the third column is a regression of other loans such as
equipment loans, motor loans, (commercial) mortgage loans and capital
leases. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate
statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
the maturity choice of a borrowing firm and loan approval/
rejection by a potential lender, especially for firms with high
credit risks.
To check robustness, I estimate the baseline regressions for
lines of credit and other types of loans separately. As can be seen
in the second and third columns of table 2, the coefficients for
‘LowRisk (D&B score 5-6)’ and ‘HighRisk (D&B score 1-2)’ are
negative regardless of loan types, but those for lines of credits
are more significant than those for other types of loans. This is
consistent with Berger and Udell (1995), who argue that lines of
credit are more likely to be affected by the lack of borrower-
specific private information than other types of loans.
The multivariate results may be affected by a multicollinearity
problem due to the strong correlation between relationship and
the interaction between relationship and the dummy variables
for risk ratings. For instance, the correlation between LowRisk
and LowRisk×Relationship is 0.91, which is the highest among
the correlation coefficients between explanatory variables. To
avoid this potential problem, I examine the effect of risk ratings
for sub-samples with different durations of banking
relationships. First, I sort the small-firm loans based on the
length of banking relationships and then assign the loans into
four groups. The first column of table 2 presents the results for
firms with short-term banking relationships, defined as those
that started at most one year before loan applications. The result
provides strong evidence of non-monotonic relationships between
risk ratings and loan maturities. The last three columns of table
2 provide the results from regression estimates of Eq. (1) for
banking relationships of more than one year. All the coefficients
for ‘LowRisk (D&B score 5-6)’ and ‘HighRisk (D&B score 1-2)’
substantially shrink and become statistically insignificant at the
0.05 level, except the coefficient for high-risk ratings for firms
with relationships of between five and ten years. To summarize,
even after controlling for multicollinearity I found that the
qualitative results of the multivariate regression remain intact.
I also explored the role of durable banking relationships. The
first column of table 2 shows that the coefficients for the
interaction terms between banking relationship and the dummy
variables for high-and low-risk ratings are positive and
significant at the 0.01 level, while the coefficient for banking
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relationship, which captures the impact of a longer relationship
for intermediate-risk firms, is negative and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. To be precise, the first column of
table 2 shows that = ∂ ln(1+macurity)/∂ ln (1–banking
reltionship) = –0.275 –0.232×LowRisk+0.258×HighRisk
implying that, for low risk ratings, the log maturity sensitivity to
log banking relationship is –0.043(= –0.275+0.232); for high risk
ratings, –0.017(= –0.275+0.258); for intermediate risk ratings,
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≤ 5yrs. ≤ 10yrs. < Dur.
ln(Total assets) -0.149** 0.088** 0.210** 0.166**
(-5.07) (4.55) (20.13) (7.34)
Ln(Firm age) (unit: years) 0.178** 0.295** -0.046 0.155*
(3.33) (8.02) (-1.09) (2.50)
ROA -0.013** 0.007 -0.056* -0.009
(-2.61) (0.16) (-2.46) (-1.53)
Cash to assets -0.704** -0.096 -0.591** 2.371**
(-3.93) (-0.52) (-3.01) (9.21)
Outside debt to assets -0.074** 0.040 0.082 -0.057*
(-5.18) (0.89) (0.89) (-2.04)
LowRisk (D&B score 5-6) -0.879** 0.335** -0.153 -0.171
(-6.25) (4.06) (-1.44) (-1.39)
HighRisk (D&B score 1-2) -0.709** 0.156 -0.244* 0.003
(-5.13) (1.54) (-2.24) (0.02)
Loan type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-digit SIC Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.971 0.981 0.985 0.962
Number of obs. 569 593 487 809
The dependent variable for regressions is log of one plus maturity.
Banking relationship refers to the period of time (in years) the first
banking service was provided to a borrowing firm. “Dur” stands for
“relationship duration,” which measures the number of years after the
first banking service was provided to a small business. Robust t
statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at
0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
–0.275 (which is significant at 0.001). In other words, for low-
and high-risk borrowers, the effect of the banking relationship is
insignificant on average, whereas for intermediate risk
borrowers, loan maturity significantly decreases with banking
relationships.
In summation, considering all types of loans, I find no
statistically significant evidence that debt maturity increases
with banking relationship (at the conventional levels). However,
lines of credit show some economic significance: the coefficient
for the lending relationship is 0.102 (=–0.406+0.508) for low-risk
borrowers (its p-value is 0.13), whereas the coefficient is –0.063(=
–0.406+0.343) for high-risk borrowers (p-value is 0.195), weakly
consistent with the prediction by Diamond (1991). These results
are also consistent with Berger and Udell (1995)’s claim that the
proprietary information gathered through durable banking
relationships mainly affects “the price and nonprice terms of
lines of credit,” which are more information-sensitive than other
types of loans.
Interestingly, regardless of type of loan, the maturity for firms
with intermediate risk ratings significantly decrease with longer
banking relationships, seemingly contradicting the informational
role of the banking relationship. This may occur because at lower
levels of information asymmetry, intermediate-risk firms can
more easily roll over their short-term loans and also shorten
their loan maturity terms to avoid higher interest charges for
long-term debt. A full analysis of this conjecture is beyond the
scope of this paper.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
In this section, I attempt to check the robustness of the main
findings further. I raise two potential problems in the previous
specifications and check the robustness of the main results. 
First of all, if the majority of the information from the Dun &
Bradstreet credit rating is in fact the same as accounting
information that is included in the empirical specifications, the
main findings may suffer from a multicollinearity problem.
Furthermore, even in the absence of extreme multicollinearity, if
much of the information from the D&B credit ratings comes from
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the same information contained in the other control variables, it
can be difficult to interpret the effects of the credit rating. For
instance, firm size proxied by total assets can be a dominant
factor in determining credit rating. After controlling for the effect
of total assets, the impact of credit rating on loan maturity will
capture only the additional credit information that is
economically less important. To investigate whether these
potential problems drive the main findings, I report the
correlations between the risk rating dummies and control
variables included in the main specifications (see table 4).
Consistent with the conjecture, Dun & Bradstreet credit rating
appears to be significantly correlated with firm size, firm age and
banking relationship. Although the estimated correlations are
not perfect, the correlations can somehow contaminate the
results. To avoid this concern, I reestimate the results of table 2
without controlling for borrower characteristics. Table 5 presents
the results. The qualitative results remain the same.
Secondly, the main findings may suffer from an omitted
variable problem. In particular, bank loans can include
restrictive clauses such as call or put features. Call (or put)
features imply that the realized debt maturities can be different
from the maturities reported in the SSBF. Despite the
importance of the issue, the SSBF does not provide detailed
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Table 4. Credit Ratings and Borrower Characteristics
Total Firm Outside Banking Low High
assets age ROA Cash debt Relationship Risk Risk
Total assets 1
Firm age 0.3076 1
ROA -0.0669 -0.0558 1
Cash -0.3694 -0.1050 -0.0540 1
Outside debt -0.2332 -0.0323 -0.5517 0.1752 1
Banking
Relationship 0.1541 0.2832 -0.0685 -0.0215 0.0117 1
LowRisk
(D&B score 5-6) -0.1534 -0.1154 0.0175 -0.076 0.0222 -0.1269 1
HighRisk
(D&B score 1-2) 0.0601 0.1966 -0.0030 0.0763 -0.0219 0.1259 -0.3769 1
The bold numbers indicate the correlation coefficients that are statistically significant
at 0.10.
information about call/put features. Instead, it provides
information on loan amounts and collateral requirements. The
introduction of restrictive covenants may be endogenously
determined by loan amount and collateral requirement. Large
loans are more likely to strengthen monitoring incentives and
require stronger protections including call features. On the other
hand, collateral requirements can provide strong protection,
replacing other restrictive covenants. These possibilities suggest
that controlling for the loan characteristics can help to mitigate
the potential bias by failing to control for detailed restrictive
covenants. If the main findings are affected sharply by
controlling for collateral requirements and loan amounts, I can
conjecture that the bias from omitting restrictive clauses can be
substantial. I check the robustness of the main findings by
reestimating the results after controlling for log of loan amount
and a dummy variable for collateral (see table 6). The main
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Table 5. (Robustness) Credit Rating and Banking Relationship
without Controls
Dep. Var.: ln(1+Maturity) All loans Lines of credit Other loans
ln(1+banking relationship) -0.232** -0.303** -0.236**
(-9.91) (-7.99) (-7.67)
LowRisk (D&B score 5-6) -0.879** -1.972** -0.581**
(-3.91) (-6.07) (-3.07)
HighRisk (D&B score 1-2) -0.798** -1.282** -0.446**
(-5.06) (-5.23) (-2.75)
LowRisk×ln(1+banking 0.210** 0.418** 0.159**
relationship) (3.41) (5.76) (2.90)
HighRisk×ln(1+banking 0.234** 0.251** 0.186**
relationship) (5.79) (4.08) (4.21)
Adjusted R2 0.508 0.494 0.581
N 2,458 817 1,641
The dependent variable for regressions is log of one plus maturity.
Banking relationship refers to the period of time (in years) the first
banking service was provided to a borrowing firm. The first column is a
regression of all types of loans; the second column is a regression of
lines of credit; the third column is a regression of other loans such as
equipment loans, motor loans, (commercial) mortgage loans and capital
leases. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate
statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table 6. (Robustness) Loan Characteristics, Credit Rating and
Banking Relationship
Dep. Var.: ln(1+Maturity) All loans Lines of credit Other loans
ln(Total assets) -0.133** 0.019 -0.137**
(-5.45) (0.53) (-5.36)
ln(Firm age) (unit: years) 0.089** 0.070 0.009
(3.47) (1.08) (0.29)
ROA -0.011** -0.016** -0.012**
(-3.03) (-3.21) (-2.60)
Cash to assets -0.343** -0.770** -0.206
(-3.05) (-2.63) (-1.68)
Outside debt to assets -0.070** 0.088* -0.074**
(-4.90) (2.03) (-4.41)
ln(1+banking relationship) -0.227** -0.382** -0.212**
(-9.77) (-8.16) (-7.22)
LowRisk (D&B score 5-6) -0.764** -2.196** -0.435*
(-4.03) (-6.85) (-2.33)
HighRisk (D&B score 1-2) -0.896** -1.599** -0.400*
(-5.29) (-5.84) (-2.44)
LowRisk×ln(1+banking 0.201** 0.496** 0.127*
relationship) (3.98) (6.89) (2.43)
HighRisk×ln(1+banking 0.225** 0.325** 0.154**
relationship) (5.44) (4.92) (3.72)
Collateral 0.012 -0.001 -0.030
(0.23) (-0.02) (-0.44)
ln( Loan amount ) 0.234** 0.093* 0.196**
(7.40) (2.27) (5.47)
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.523 0.609
N 2,458 817 1,641
The dependent variable for regressions is log of one plus maturity.
Banking relationship refers to the period of time (in years) the first
banking service was provided to a borrowing firm. The first column is a
regression of all types of loans; the second column is a regression of
lines of credit; the third column is a regression of other loans such as
equipment loans, motor loans, (commercial) mortgage loans and capital
leases. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate
statistical significance at 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
findings remain intact.
CONCLUSION
In this study, I have tested the predictions of Flannery’s and
Diamond’s theoretical models of debt maturity. Both theoretical
models predict that risk and information asymmetry affect firms’
optimal choice of debt maturity, albeit with different
mechanisms. Flannery (1986) predicts that, under information
asymmetry, debt maturity is a monotonically increasing function
of risk, whereas Diamond (1991) predicts that it is a non-
monotonic function of risk: low- and high-risk firms borrow on a
shorter-term basis than those with intermediate risk. 
To test the predictions of Diamond’s and Flannery’s models,
this study focuses on the role of the banking relationship in loan
maturity choice. Extensive literature in the topic of finance
shows that, among financial institutions, banks are unique
because of their ability to access borrowers’ proprietary
information through durable relationships. The longer the
relationship between lenders and borrowers, the more the former
can learn about the latter’s risk characteristics, hence reducing
information asymmetry and thereby benefiting both parties. Here
I examine how the durable relationship affects the link between
risk rating and maturity. I find that when banking relationship is
relatively short, firms with low and high risk ratings tend to
borrow on a shorter-term basis than firms with intermediate
risk, confirming the prediction of Diamond’s (1991) model but
contrary to Flannery’s (1986). In addition, I establish the impact
of information asymmetry on the link between credit rating and
loan maturity. Interestingly, (at the conventional significance
levels) I find no evidence that longer business relationships lead
to longer loan maturity terms for low- and high-risk firms, while
for intermediate-risk firms the banking relationship is negatively
correlated with loan maturity. In other words, durable banking
relationship appears to weaken the impact of credit ratings on
debt maturity. Overall, the findings here suggest that
information asymmetry is at the core of the link between risk
ratings and debt maturity.
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